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The South African (SA) Constitution is committed to 
the progressive realisation of the right to healthcare.[1] 
However, in South Africa and abroad, it is not always 
possible for optimal medical treatment to be provided 
for every patient. This is due to resource scarcity: 
shortfalls in equipment, personnel, and funds make it impossible for 
every person to receive the treatment that would be best for them.[2]
Practitioners and policymakers alike are painfully aware that such 
shortfalls mean that allocation decisions will involve trade-offs, 
prioritising some patients or patient groups at the expense of others. 
But on what basis are such trade-offs made? What criteria should be 
used to decide who gets treatment and who does not? It is important 
that these criteria are explicit and ethically defensible as they affect 
who gets treatment and who does not, who lives and who dies. 
It has become increasingly common for ethical theorists in the 
developed world to consider employing the criterion of age: where 
there is competition for health resources, the young should be 
favoured.[2–6] This type of discrimination can be employed at micro-, 
meso-, and macro-levels[7] of healthcare allocation. For instance, 
at the micro-level of individual practitioner decisions, it could 
mean that practitioners do not refer the elderly to more specialised 
secondary and tertiary levels of care. At the meso-level of hospital and 
practitioner policy, training for geriatric care may be deprioritised. At 
the macro-level of national or provincial health decisions, policies may 
favour the treatment of HIV/AIDS at the expense of geriatric medicine 
programmes because the former predominantly afflicts the young.
Significantly, age discrimination is already practised both tacitly 
and explicitly: all of the above are real examples from a South African 
health context and many more could be supplied.[8] This is worrisome, 
not least since the elderly are a vulnerable population whose rights 
require special protection.[9] The Older Persons Act explicitly states 
that the elderly are entitled to be respected, to be treated fairly and 
equitably, and to be protected against ‘unfair discrimination on any 
ground’.[10] This means that it is vitally important to bring out potential 
justifications for age discrimination and question whether examples 
like those above involve unfairness.
Developed world bioethicists have debated these justifications 
extensively. However, bioethicists, healthcare practitioners, and 
legal experts in developing world contexts such as SA have been 
slower to comment on the ethical significance of age discrimination. 
In focusing on a SA context, this article contributes a different 
perspective to the broader debate about age-based rationing. 
However, the central contribution of the paper is to draw attention 
to highly questionable premises that underlie age discrimination, 
which nonetheless remain largely unquestioned in SA bioethics and 
health policy.
Many argue that there are good, principled reasons for favouring 
the young. In particular, it is sometimes suggested that the elderly 
provide a reduced social contribution, that the elderly have already 
had their fair share of life, and that they will benefit less from health 
resources. I will assess the criteria implicit in each of these claims, and 
the extent to which they apply to the elderly, and suggest that they 
fail to justify age discrimination.
Social contribution
It’s sometimes thought that the degree to which individuals contribute 
to society should play a role in who gets medical resources. For 
instance, prioritising breadwinners is thought to be justified because 
they have many dependants who rely on them.[11] The elderly on the 
other hand are often regarded as a burden on society. Older people 
extract a pension and after pensioning age may not contribute as 
much economically.
Interestingly, this type of consideration is reflected in one 
of the most prominent measures of the burden of disease: the 
Disability Adjusted Life Year (DALY) is endorsed by the World Health 
Organization and increasingly by health researchers and the South 
African government. The measure commonly ‘weights’ unhealthy 
middle years as contributing more to the burden of disease than 
unhealthy later years, since those in middle age are likely to provide a 
greater social and economic contribution.
However, the social contribution criterion, and the idea that 
the elderly contribute less are, respectively, morally and factually 
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dubious. If social contribution is a relevant criterion, it requires 
discriminating in favour of those regarded as making greater 
economic, social and cultural contributions, such as presidents, 
politicians, celebrities, factory owners, and rich people who pay more 
tax. We would also be forced to discriminate against individuals who 
make smaller contributions, such as poor people, children, those 
without dependants or jobs, and the mentally ill. All of these provide 
a reduced contribution, but healthcare decisions that discriminate 
against these groups are rightly regarded as unacceptable. 
The social contribution criterion therefore provides grounds for 
preferring people we don’t think deserve preference, and for dis-
criminating against groups who require the most social support. 
Such a criterion should be rejected. Even if we accepted it, however, 
it is false to claim that the elderly contribute less to society. A brief 
look at the pages of history will show many elderly figures who 
have made disproportionate social contributions. Nelson Mandela 
is a prime example of a person who contributed massively well 
beyond his 75th year, but the contributions of elderly people are 
not limited to those who are famous. In SA, in particular, the aged 
are responsible for looking after families decimated by HIV/AIDS.[8] 
They are also stores of cultural knowledge that have immense social 
value. 
It might still be maintained that the elderly make a reduced 
economic contribution, since they draw from benefit schemes and 
do not earn a wage or pay taxes. However, this contention entirely 
ignores the lifetime contributions of the elderly, which surely incur 
an obligation of reciprocity. Moreover, it should be noticed that, to 
the extent that there is a reduction of economic contribution, this 
is in part due to the fact that the elderly are often forced to retire 
by mandatory retirement ages. It would be grossly unfair to prevent 
someone from working, and then deprive them of medical treatment 
because they no longer work. 
The social contribution criterion is deeply problematic, as is 
the idea that the elderly provide a reduced social contribution. 
Discriminating against the elderly in resource allocation decisions 
cannot be justified on this basis.
Fairness
A further attempt at justifying age discrimination is provided by the 
idea of a fair innings. Some argue that one goal of health services 
should be to ensure that each person has the same opportunity for 
a fair number of healthy years: we should all get a fair opportunity to 
play the game of life for the same time. Williams[3] suggests that, on 
this basis, it may sometimes be justified to discriminate against the 
elderly, since they have had a greater share of the good of life. The 
young should get healthcare resources, so as to give them a better 
opportunity for a ‘complete life’.[2]
The fair innings criterion is certainly more convincing than the social 
contribution criterion, and evidence suggests that many people 
endorse this reason for deprioritising the elderly.[12] However, the fair 
innings view is also ethically questionable. Once again, employing 
the criterion would mean discriminating in favour of individuals 
we do not think should be preferred. For instance, fetuses have 
had only a fraction of their fair innings. Nonetheless, only the most 
zealous pro-lifer would think that we should save a fetus’s life over 
that of its mother, who has had a greater share of her fair innings.  It 
could be claimed that the preference for mothers in this case is due 
to the fact that the fetus is not a fully-fledged person. As a non-
person, perhaps its share of life should not figure substantially in our 
weighing-up. Although many reject the idea that the unborn embryo 
is not a person, accepting this controversial view might rescue the fair 
innings criterion from one counter-intuitive consequence. 
There are, however, additional, less easily escapable criticisms 
of the fair innings view. The fair innings requirement might also 
condone extreme discrimination against the very old. If one lives 
110 good years one has drastically exceeded one’s quotient. Because 
the extreme elderly have already had much more than their fair 
share, the fair innings argument may recommend denying them 
any opportunity to access interventions even if they would benefit 
much more than a younger person. Similarly, even inexpensive care 
or treatments might be entirely denied to the elderly just because 
they have exhausted their fair share of resources. A criterion that 
recommends such neglect must be rejected.
Moreover, even if the fair innings criterion were accepted, being 
old is an unreliable indicator of fairness: it is often false to say that 
an older person has had his or her fair share of life’s goods. Many 
older persons will have lived lives of deprivation, hardship and 
disability. This is particularly true in nations, such as SA, in which 
the vast majority of elderly people have been the victims of unjust 
deprivation and discrimination throughout their lives. Often elderly 
black persons who have lived through apartheid will not have had 
their fair share of life’s goods. If applied correctly, then, the fair 
innings criterion may require favouring the elderly in nations such 
as our own.
The fair innings requirement seems to have a degree of appeal. 
Nonetheless it should once again be clear that the criterion is 
flawed. And even if it was not, it provides inadequate grounds for 
discriminating against the elderly, particularly in SA.
Degree and likelihood of benefit
The strongest basis for discriminating against the elderly is the 
principle that we should do the most good and provide the most 
benefit with the resources at our disposal. This common sense idea is 
related to the bioethical principle of beneficence and has a theoretical 
foundation in utilitarian ethical theory.[13] On the face of it, it seems 
likely that more benefit will accrue by treating the young rather than 
the elderly. A person who receives a heart transplant at the age of 40 is 
likely to gain many more healthy life years than a person who receives 
a transplant at the age of 85. The older person is likely to have poorer 
health and die from other causes before he or she can enjoy the full 
benefit of the intervention.
Despite its intuitive appeal, though, the benefit criterion has some 
unpalatable implications. If we accept it, we should discriminate 
against all groups with reduced life expectancy. Smokers and the 
overweight become obvious candidates to be deprioritised in health 
allocation decisions. Some find this consequence acceptable. Less 
easy to defend, though, is the implication that we should discriminate 
on grounds of race, class, or occupation. It is an unfortunate fact 
that certain races and classes live shorter lives.[14] Similarly, those 
in dangerous professions such as soldiers, policemen, and miners 
are likely to have reduced life expectancy. The benefit requirement 
unacceptably provides grounds for health decisions to discriminate 
against these groups along with the elderly.
Nonetheless, as discussed earlier, we do need some method of 
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making allocation decisions, and perhaps a refined benefit criterion 
is the best of a bad bunch. Even if we accepted a benefit requirement, 
though, this would not provide grounds for generalised discrimination 
against the elderly. This is because the range of treatments from 
which the elderly are less likely to benefit appears to be extremely 
limited. These include life-saving treatments with very long-term 
benefits, such as organ transplants and heart surgery. Moreover, even 
deciding that the elderly should not get these is questionable. There 
is huge variability in humans’ age-relative health profiles, which gives 
rise to differences in expected healthy life years. This means that it 
would be far better to assess individual chances of benefit rather than 
generalise according to chronological age.
Once again, the benefit criterion is flawed. And once again, even 
its acceptance would not justify blanket discrimination against the 
elderly.
An objection: the elderly are willing to 
take a back seat
Before concluding, it is worthwhile to pre-empt a common objection 
to the claim of this paper. The objection is that the elderly themselves 
often wish for young people to be treated ahead of them. It is 
certainly true that the opinions and decisions of the elderly, with 
regard to their own care, must be respected. It is arguably wrong for 
a practitioner to supply care that any capable patient, old or young, 
does not want. 
Even so, two responses should be made to this objection. First, it is 
highly likely that the elderly themselves may have internalised some 
of the above flawed arguments for discrimination. When an elderly 
person offers such arguments for favouring the young, there may be 
a moral obligation to try to make the person aware of the unsound 
basis of their preference.
The second response is that, like many of the arguments in favour of 
age discrimination, it rests on a claim that is no more applicable to the 
elderly than it is to others. While it is certainly true that some elderly 
people prefer that others should be helped first, this is also true of 
many younger altruistic people. Moreover, it is true of the elderly far 
less often than many people think.[15] It is incorrect to assume that 
elderly people simply accept that they should fall further down the 
pecking order in resource allocation decisions. Policymakers and 
healthcare practitioners should not base discriminatory resource 
allocation decisions on this false assumption.
Conclusion
It is not just abuse of the elderly that is wrong. Although such abuse 
is abhorrent and must be remedied, it is important to note that 
the elderly are discriminated against in more subtle, passive, and 
systematic ways. The non-provision of interventions to which they 
are as ethically and legally entitled as younger people can be as 
damaging as active abuse. As it stands, the elderly are tacitly, explicitly, 
and systematically discriminated against at all levels of healthcare. 
Policymakers and healthcare practitioners have an ethical and legal 
obligation to ensure that the vulnerable elderly should not bear an 
unfair burden due to unjustified resource allocation decisions.
In case this obligation to others is not motivational enough, it 
is also worth pointing out that it is in each individual’s interest to 
undermine unfair discrimination: we all grow old, so it makes sense 
to defend our rights before we become vulnerable to their violation.
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